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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to uncover the relationship between
Japan’s prefectural budgetary procedures and incrementalism.
Specifi
cally, I will measure the statistical correlations between my dependent
variable, demonstrated budgetary flexibility, and a number of proposed
explanatory variables. My hypothesis is that within Japan’s prefectures
the departmental budget-shares do not change much, on the average, from
year to year; that they are incremental.
Both the computer model and the assorted variables which have been
incorporated into this analysis were extracted from Robert Rickards’
doctoral dissertation.
Although this thesis does not offer an explicit
comparative study, it does include some cross-national summaries which
may be useful in some future comparative analysis.
The results of this study suggest that within some prefectures
dynamic, non-incremental processes are in operation. Yet these dynamic
processes are not as significant when statistical averages of Japan’s
prefectural budgetary-shares are calculated.

JAPAN’S PREFECTURAL BUDGETARY
PROCESS: AN INCREMENTAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I
INCREMENTALISM:

ITS ORIGIN AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

The act of budgeting finite resources among infinite demands has
necessitated that governments develop priority-setting frameworks.

In

their attempts to formulate such rational budgetary priorities many
theorists have concluded that incremental decision-making is the best
available routine to follow.
Within this thesis I will investigate the relationship between Japan's
prefectural budgetary strategy and incremental procedures.

Both the con

troversy surrounding such strategies and the pervasiveness of these incre
mental routines in Japan's prefectural governments will be analyzed.
The following study answers two questions concerning the incrementalist
controversy.

First, how much does budget-share stability among Japan's

prefectures fluctuate?

Second, under what conditions are the greatest

deviations from existing budget-share patterns most likely to occur?

The

subsequent answers to these questions will indicate the reliance of Japan's
prefectures on budgetary strategies which produce incremental change.

The

findings will also suggest how a government may, most easily, transfer
resources across departmental categories.

The organizational complexity

exhibited in the prefectures, and other environmental and political variables,
will be demonstrated in this paper to be related to a particular prefecture';s
ability to shift resources among various departments.
Contemporary political scientists have offered a number of incremental
models to the interested reader.

Most of these studies have concluded

2

3
.that the spending priorities of a government's administrative units are
quite inflexibile, and thus incremental, at the final stages of the
resource allocation decision-making process.^"

While most political

scientists agree that incrementalism is an important factor when explain
ing the stability of the administrative ® | t fs budget shares ,'.they do
offer a number of alternative explanations concerning the extent of
dynamic non-incremental forces at lower levels of the budgetary process.

2

The significance of incremental techniques on the federal budget of
the United States has been investigated since the 1950s.

Charles Lindbloom

has described incremental budgeting as both a valid and rational way to
reach policy decisions.

An administrator, states Lindbloom, ". . . would

rely heavily on the record of past experiences with small policy steps
to predict the consequences of similar steps extended into the future."

3

Lindblbbm's administrator is a man with limited knowledge, information,
and ability who makes policy choices by rationally making marginal adjust
ments in past successful politics to formulate current budgetary strategies.
He points out that most political or public policies represent a contin
uing attack on ever-present problems, and, therefore, there is always a

Robert C. Rickards, "Non-Routine Decision-Making: A Study of
Demonstrated Flexibility in West German Municipalities' Budgetary Priority
Setting" (Diss.
University of Michigan, 1980), p. 242. Rickards' findings
run contrary to most other budget theorists conclusions in that his
study revealed some budget-share changes up to 17 percent from one year to
the next. Therefore, the final stage of the resource allocation decision
making process is not necessarily as inflexible as many budgetary theorists
conclude.
2

The term "budget-share" refers to the proportional distribution of
a prefecture's budget to its departmental categories.

3
Charles E. Lindbloom, "The Science of Muddling Through" in Public
Administration: Concepts and Cases, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co.,
1976), p. 151.

4
precedent to follow and adjust.
Another aspect of the Lindbloom definition concerning policy-making
is that policy problems are fragmented and dealt with individually,
rather than comprehensively.

Both Lindbloom*s emphasis on historical

precedent and fragmentation have been incorporated into the many
contemporary budgetary models available to the reader of incremental
phenomena.
John Crecine declares, much like Lindbloom, that the decision-maker
cannot possibly deal with the budget if historical precedent and frag
mented methods of analysis are not adopted.

Crecine states that the

immense complexity inherent in the budgetary process necessitates that
methods aimed at simplifying the annual budget be adopted.

In Crecine’s

research, the mayor illustrated this policy strategy by breaking down
the balanced budget problem into a set of more manageable subproblems.
The mayor also relies on last year’s budget when formulating his new
budget.
11. . . a logical way to proceed in solving the complex budgeting
problems is to take last year’s solution (current appropriation)
and modify it in light of the change in available resources and
the change in municipal problems and their available solutions,
to obtain this year’s solution."

4

The lack of both perfect knowledge and information in the budgetary
process, and the subsequent use of "aids to calculation", has been
acknowledged by many budgetary theorists as the most rational method
available for easing the complexity of the decision-making

4

John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem Solving: A Computer
Simulation of Municipal Budgeting, (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1969).

5
5

process.

An article by Otto Davis, M. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky
describes the effects of the executive on budgetary procedures which
produce incremental change at the federal level in similar terms to
CrecineTs analysis of the mayor's effect at the municipal level of govern£
ment.
One important difference is that it is not necessary to balance
the federal budget.

Both Davis ejt. al. and Crecine attribute traditional

bureaucratic roles to the chief executive.

The mayor and his staff's duty

towards the budget is to fulfill the legal obligation of submitting a
balanced budget to council for consideration.
primary importance to the mayor.

A balanced budget is of

A mayor who faces a deficit may reduce

agency requests by following a series of search routines designed to
identify the most feasible solution to the budgetary problem.
Davis e_t. al. also perceive of the chief executive's role in the
budget as including the ability to manipulate agency requestsrin order to
promote executive priorities and reduce the deficit.

The president's and

his staff’s concern with balancing the budget is less crucial to their
decision-making process than it is to the mayor.

An annual federal deficit

is an accepted fact in the United States and is not as damaging as it is
to municipalities, due to the federal government’s ability to create money
and control monetary policies.

Because of less stringent spending restraints

Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 11-17. Wildavsky defines aids to
calculation as those mechanisms which help to generate meaningful decisions
out of a very complicated process. ’'Satisficing” (to satisfy and suffice),
"guestimating", simplifying, and incrementally adjusting are the four
major components of Wildavsky's aids to calculation.
£
Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, nA Theory of
the Budgetary Process” in The American Political Science Review, (September,
1966), p. 529.

6
it is reasonable to assume that national level expenditure patterns will
display less incrementalism than those for subnational governments.
John Crecine*s and Aaron Wildavsky!s writings indicate that in
the United States, at both the municipal and federal levels, agencies
attempt to amplify and preserve their budget appropriations and status.
Robert Kharasch has described this characteristic as the "institutional
imperative".

Every action or decision of an institution must be intended

to keep the institutional machinery working.^

Kharasch states that it

is an atmosphere of survival and growth which pervades the entire American
public bureaucracy.

Both Crecine and Wildavsky have drawn the conclusions

that the institutional imperative is demonstrated by agencies at both
the municipal and federal levels of government.
John Crecine and Aaron Wildavsky have described the budgetary process
as being an incremental procedure.

They assumed that public policy

making was therefore incrementally organized.
"By focusing on the stability of agencies structures, and on the
longevity of most programs, quantitative researchers have concluded
that budgeting and public policy are incremental because an inecrt ;
bureaucracy has sunk so much into existing programs that to start
g

from scratch is too disruptive, wasteful, and impractical."
This argument for considering public policy as nessarily incrementally
organized has been criticized by some contemporary budget theorists.

Robert Kharasch, The Institutional Imperative: How to Understand
the United States Government and Other Bulky Objects, (New York:
Charterhouse Books, 1973), p. 24.
William L. Morrow, Public Administration:
Politics, Policy, and
the Political System, (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 350).

Two such budget theorists are Peter Natchez and Irving Bupp.
In their study, Natchez and Bupp defend Wildavsky's position that
budgeting is incremental by nature.

The issue which they address is the

claim by Wildavsky and others that the budgetary process produces clearcut conclusions concerning public policy.

Natchez and Bupp lay the blame

for this erroneous claim not in the logic of the political scientists' analysis
but in the method of inquiry they employed.

Wildavsky and others concen

trated on agencies and departments as the unit of analysis.

Drawing a set

of equations from this data revealed the great stability (incrementalism)
of the budgetary process.

Natchez and Bupp contend that:

". . . because administrative categories have formed the basis of
budgeting analysis, the entire process in which public policy is
produced has been obscured."

9

Natchez and Bupp argue that political scientists who follow the quanti
tative approach, such as Wildavsky, are victims of its own theoretical and
statistical precision.

They believe that in order to understand the role

of policy choices in the budgetary process the level of analysis must be
shifted from agencies, departments, and ministries to programs.
"It is this variation in the competitive success of alternative pro
grams, rather than the cognitive process of decision-makers, which is
central to the politics of public administration."^
9
Irving C. Bupp and Peter B. Natchez, "Policy and Priority in the
Budgetary Process," in The American Political Science Review, (September,
1973), pp. 951-952.
~^ I b i d ., p. 955. Natchez and Bupp illustrate the dynamic policy proce
dures operating at lower levels of the budgetary and decision-making pro
cess by formulating a case study of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In
their final analysis they substantiate their initial hypothesis: The
success of the AEC weapons program and the failure of other programs was
due to the aggressive roles of the division directors at the lower levels
of the decision-making process.

8
This thesis analyzes the budget-share stability of Japan's prefectual
departments.

Natchez has stated that my method of analysis may obscure

some of the public policy process.

But just as department heads must

choose among different levels of funding for various programs in formu
lating the department's budget request, so must the chief executive choose
among different funding levels for the various departments in formulating
his overall budget proposals.

So studying how prefectures allocate funds

among various departments still captures important elements of the policy
making process.

Furthermore, while there may not be comparable programs

in all prefectures, there are comparable departments (due to laws providing
for uniform structures of local government in Japan).

So by choosing the

department level of analysis one is able to get away from verbal descriptions
of single cases and apply large-group statistics to the study of 46 pre
fectures’ budgetary behavior.
By relying on statistical data that has been drawn from the final
stages of the budgetary process, I have ignored the potential for dynamic
and aggressive competition at lower operating levels of the prefectures'
budget strategy.

Both this weakness and the loss of detail resulting from

the trade off of single case descriptions for large group statistics must
be aknowledged.

Yet the structural similarity of Japan's prefectural

departments and the empirical validity of large-group statistics overweigh
the critisicms which Natchez and Bupp have directed at budget analyses
which rely on administrative categories for their methodological approach.
Lance LeLoup and William Moreland have supported Natchez and Bupp's
conclusion.

Their case study of the Office of Management and Budget and

the Department of Agriculture concludes that the component stages of the
annual appropriation process are more dynamic than the overall results

indicate.

They identified "pork barrel" politics and interest group

support as being important factors in agency growth.
"To obtain substantial non-incremental increases in programs and
budgets, an agency must attain a position of political strength
(with support inside and outside of government) to justify a large
increase. ..11
The pervasiveness of the institutional imperative within the American bureau
cracy, at all levels of government, does suggest that the component stages
of the appropriation process are less incremental than the final results
would indicate.
Incremental explanations have been., frequently relied upon by budgetary
analysts to account for the budgetary behavior they observed.

Due to their

simplicity and explanatory capacity, these incremental explanations have
become popular in a number of case studies concerning budgeting in United
States cities,

12

local school systems,

13

American states,

1A

national govern-

15
, .
.
16
ments,
and international organizations.

"^Lance T. LeLoup and William Moreland, "Agency Strategies and
Executive Review: The Hidden Politics of Budgeting," in Public
Administration Review, (January, 1978), p. 239.

12

Thomas Anton, Budgeting in Three Illinois Cities, (Urbana, Illinois:
Institute of Governmental and Public Affairs, 1964).
13

Donald A. Gerwin, Budgeting Public Funds: The Decision Process in
an Urban School District, (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin, 1969).
14

Thomas Anton, The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois,
(Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1966).
15

John Creighton Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics,
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977).
16

Francis Hoole, Brian Job, and Harvey Tucker, "Incremental Budgeting
and International Organizations," in the American Journal of Political
Science, (May, 1976), pp. 273-301.

10
It is important for the reader of this paper to understand my
definition of incrementalism.

The term indicates that prefectual depart

ments are allocated across-the-board, fixed percentage increases in
spending appropriations, resulting in little or no change in budgetshares among departments.

Incrementalism suggests that little budgetary

flexibility is demonstrated among a prefecture’s budget-shares.

It is

not an applied strategy in budgetary decision-making, but rather, incrementa
lism is the result of a kind of bureaucratic momentum.
The incremental model of budgetary analysis has become popular due
to both its ability to account for historical expenditure patterns and
the theoretical vacuum which it filled.

Previous normative theories of

budgeting could not adequately explain the stability and inflexibility of
budget shares among administrative units.

Classical economic theories

relied heavily on the a priori validity of their normative assumptions.
These assumptions basically stated that government ought to be aware of
and responsive to citizens’ changing wants and needs.
Contemporary studies have indicated that these assumptions are not
followed in reality.

Charles Lindbloom’s attempt to replace these a priori

principles with more empirical techniques has generated great support
within the field of political science.

To increase the manageability of

resource allocation, both fragmentation and historical precedent have been
accepted as the best tools available.
Despite their widespread acceptance and demonstrated predictive
qualities, incremental budgeting routines have been surrounded by contro
versy.

One significant reason for this conflict of opinion is the lack

of unified and popularly accepted boundaries between incremental and nonincremental change.

This lack of unifying propositions is depicted by

11
the many different explanations of incrementalism available to the
student of budgetary analysis.

What one author perceived of as a

large incremental change may be considered as an insignificant change
by another.

Whereas Richard Fenno defines less than a twenty percent

increase in U.S.
James Danziger,

federal agency requests as a large incremental c h a n g e , ^
in his study of British county-borough expenditures,

defines a non-incremental change as being over three percent of last

,1

,18
year s level.
Although this lack of unifying propositions.has hindered the compara
bility of many budget analyses, it has not impeded this study.

Throughout

my research, I have neither emphasized the percentage change in total
expenditure bases nor have I defined incrementalism in a percentage-cate
gorical way.

Rather, my research concentrates on whether adjustments

made in departmental budget shares occur on a fixed-percentage across-theboard basis.
Within this chapter I have considered the views of some budgetary
theorists concerning the significance of incremental techniques in budget
ing..

Agreement exists among these writers regarding the strong incremental

characteristics exhibited in the final appropriation stages of the
budgetary strategy.

The basic argument among

some theorists concerns

the appropriate method for measuring and identifying the process in which
public policy is produced.

I have defended the departmental level of

analysis as an empirically constructed method of research.

Allocations to

departments are decision outputs just as much as are allocations to pro
grams.

Moreover,

the department level of analysis is the most central

measure for the question which is addressed in this thesis.

Does budgetary

resource reallocation occur across the prefectural departments of Japan

12
of just within them?
Chapter II will focus on the budgetary strategy exhibited within
J a p a n ’s prefectures.

The chapter will also contain a descriptive analysis

of J a p a n ’s federal budget strategy and the important role of balance
to this decision-making process.

Due to the lack of available information

on J a p a n ’s prefectual budgetary behavior, I will - - by necessity - rely on J a pan’s national budgetary characteristics when developing this
analysis.
In Chapter II the research strategy will be presented.

This chapter

will also contain a description of the computer model and variables employed
in my analysis.

Chapter IV will focus on my findings concerning inter-

prefectural variations in budget-share stability.

Some of the more

significant explanatory variables tested in this chapter will be subjected
to correlation and regression runs in order to identify their relationship
with the independent v a r iable, budgetary flexibility.
conclusions to my study will be presented.

In Chapter V the

This concluding chapter will

also contain some discussion suggesting future applications
evidence revealed in this thesis to budgetary questions.

of the

CHAPTER II
JAPAN'S BUDGETARY BEHAVIOR

John Campbell's research on Japan's national budgetary strategy has
been instrumental to this analysis.

19

Much of his work emphasizes the

cultural significance of Japan's exhibited budgetary behavior and, in
this.respect, his findings are readily adaptable to the prefectural level
of analysis.

Campbell suggests that there is an interwoven connection in

Japan between its culturally supported norms and organizational strategy.
This view has been sustained by a sociological study conducted by Chie
Nakane.^
The pronounced emphasis within Japanese society on consensus and
balance has inhibited the development in Japan's bureaucracy of the
"institutional imperative".

This characteristic of American bureaucratic

agencies and departments is not applicable to Japan's budgetary behavior.
John Campbell has revealed that in Japan's federal bureaucracy, and through
out its society, the emphasis on consensus and balance outweighs a ministry's
desire to increase its proportional slice of the budget pie.

While a

ministry may not seek to increase budget shares at the expense of others,

19

Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics and John Creighton
Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu" in Modern Japanese Organization and
Decision Making, ed. by Ezra Vogel (Berkely: Univ. of California Press,
1975), pp. 75 - 100.

20

Chie Nakane, Japanese Society, (Berkely: Univ. of California
Press, 1970), pp. 144 - 146.
Chie Nakane.indicates that the Japanese
compulsion with balance in their interpersonal relations and organizational
structures is directly attributed to cultural norms.

13

14 ’
it will insist on a fixed-percentage, across-the-board increase.

This

priority within Japan of equitable treatment and harmony is an important
factor in understanding the strong role or incrementalism in Japan's
budgetary decision-making.
John Campbell's analysis of Japan's budgetary process indicates
that its budget-shares are even more stable than are those of the
United States, France, and Britain (Table I).

The term budget shares

may be defined as the proportion of the entire budget which is allocated
to the various ministries and their departments.

The great stability

between Japan's ministerial budget-shares is depicted in Table I.

Between

the years 1961 and 1970 Japan's ministerial budget-shares, in more than
half the cases (57 percent), altered their budget shares less than five
percent annually.

Whether this stability is similarly demonstrated at

Japan's prefectural level will be considered later in this thesis.

Suffice

it to say at this point that Campbell's findings should be approximated
in this study if incremental techniques .are as widely applicable and
culturally supported in Japan as Campbell assumes.
Campbell states that the great stability of budget shares in both
ministries and bureaus springs from the cultural significance in Japan
of balance and specifically to the norm of "baransu" .

Baransu does not

refer to a concept which is easily.identifiable in western cultures.
"The word did not refer to equalizing environmental revenues and
expenditures as in American budget terminology; it seemed to mean
evenhandedness or equitable treatment."

21

The concept of baransu is revealed by Campbell as being closely related

21

Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu", p. 73.

15
to the organizational behavior exhibited in Japanese politics and in
society in general.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan (a

mass or umbrella party covering many small, competing interest groups)
is a primary example of how the norm of baransu permeates Japan’s organi
zational strategy.

Although the LDP has controlled the Diet since 1955

and has a virtual monopoly of governmental power, the norm of baransu
demands that the opinions of small factions and opposing parties be heard
and acted upon.

Consensus is a key strategy in both Japanese society

and within its specific organizational structures.
Kono Kazuyuki, a former Japanese vice-minister of finance, states
that balance among expenditures is an important criterion used by the
Budget Bureau when reviewing ministerial requests for budget appropriations.

22

In Japan’s budgetary strategy, expenditures in the same category

or similar items are balanced.

A closely related idea in American budgeting

procedures has been defined by Aaron Wildavsky as "fair share".

23

Baransu, applied to the budgetary process, results in the avoidance
of any form of cost-benefit analysis since the quality and efficiency of
a particular program, bureau, or ministry are not considered.

Campbell"'

repeatedly draws the conclusion that Japan's budgetary techniques are
strongly based on incremental techniques.
"Balancing represents avoidance of comparisons among programs and their
merits by implying that simply because they are similar they should

22

Hugh Patrick, "Cyclical Instability and Fiscal-Monetary Policy Nin
Postwar Japan," in The State and Economic Enterprises in Japan, ed. by
William Lockwood (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press. 1965), pp. 595-597.
23

Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 17. Wildavsky
describes fair share as more than just the base amount of expected agency
appropriations.
Fair share denotes the expectations that an agency will
receive some proportion of the extra funds, if any, which are to be
increased over the base of the various governmental agencies.

16

Table I
Distribution of Yearly Change-In-Shares, Four Nations
(Unit:

Period

Percent)

0-5%

5-10%

10-15%

15-20%

Over
20%

Total
100.5

Japan

1961-1970

57.1

19.2

13.6

5.0

5.6

France

1960-1969

49.5

25.7

12.4

0.0

12.4

100.00

United States

1959-1968

37.4

29.7

14.2

9.0

9.7

100.00

Great Britain

1960-1970

16.9

34.9

14.1

14.1

19.8

99.8

Notes:
This table was extracted from John Campbell’s Contemporary Japanese
Budget Politics, p. 98. The original source of this information was
taken by Campbell from Aaron Wildavsky’s Budgeting, (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1975), p. 242.

17
receive the same or equivalent budgets."

24

From Wildavsky1s perspective, baransu may be considered an aid
to calculation since it eases the massive decision-making burden on
budgetary participants.

A weakness of such incremental aids to calcu

lation is that the efficiency and effectiveness of administrative units
are not systematically measured.

Budget-shares within and between

ministries are balanced for the sake of balance and not in terms of the
most good for the least cost.

Therefore baransu, like fair share, contains

dysfunctional aspects, efficiency is sacrificed for simplicity.
According to Campbell, Japan’s national budget is more affected by
incremental techniques than its U.S. counterpart.
"The Japanese budgetary system seems more routinzed, less program
matic, and more likely to produce the same old decisions year
after year than the budgetary systems of the west.
impression is strengthened when

Indeed this

one considers such distinctively

Japanese., elements as the norm of "balance" which works against
changes, or the unusual degree of penetration by the majority party
organization into the budget system.
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Incremental aids to calculation have been formalized within Japan's budget
stipulations.

A Japanese law restricts each ministry’s budget request

to not more than 125 percent of last year’s appropriation.

This potential

increase includes cost of living and wage hikes within the ministries
and is therefore considerably less than a 25 percent increase.
2A
25
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Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu," p. 76.

Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics, p. 275/ Campbell
states that the LDP’s effect on the budgetary process has tended to increase
the stability of the ministries1 budget-shares.
OC
Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu," p. 81. The development within
the ministries of new programs is also funded by this potential 25 percent
annual increase.
It should be noted that this maximum alloted appropriation
request is frequently not authorized.
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This maximum percentage increase stipulation is also applied within a
ministry’s bureaus:

thus the budgetary process in Japan’s national

government is, by law, incrementally organized.

The budgets of United

States agencies are more influenced by political support in the Congress
and Executive, and particularly by appropriation subcommittees.
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The ministry of Finance's (MOF) voluntary reduction of its own
power in planning the budget illustrates the particular significance of
balance and consensus within Japan’s bureaucracy.

To avoid conflict

with the LDP and to increase harmony among political and bureaucratic
participants, the MOF relegated control over individual program spending
to the experts in the spending ministries and the LDP by 1970.

Instead

of allocating funds to specific policy areas inside the ministries, as was
the case in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the MOF in 1970 gave such discretionary
power to the LDP and spending ministries.
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Another reason for the MOF

to abdicate some of its budget-making authority and increase the consensus
among budgetary participants is the formidable power of the LDP.

The

Liberal Democratic Party has ruled Japan from the 1950’s to the present,
and seems likely to do so for the indefinite future.
The MOF voluntarily reduced its power over microbudgeting decisions
in order to increase the consensus among all involved in the budgeting
strategy.

This action reveals the pronounced difference between the

Japanese and American bureaucracies.

Japanese budgetary behavior does

not seem to follow the same "institutional imperatives" which Robert

27

Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, Congress, The Bureaucracy, and
Public Policy, (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1980), p. 67.
28
Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu, "pp. 96-97.
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Kharasch has defined as the basic drive of all American bureaucratic
agencies and committees.

By inhibiting the aggressiveness and competi

tive qualities found in American bureaucratic organizations, the Japanese
system of budgeting should demonstrate more incrementalism than does
the U.S. system.
John Campbell has emphasized the strong incrementalism exhibited
within Japan's resource allocation process.

While Japan does appear

to contain culturally supportive norms as bureaucracy, it may be less
pronounced than Campbell contends.

A reason for suggesting this point

is that Campbell analyzed a single case (Japan’s national government) and
thus the norm of baransu and its relationship with budgetary behavior is
less statistically significant than a multivariate analysis would be.
By investigating the relationship between budget-share stability and
46 Japanese prefectural governments, I would expect to be able to
explain this relationship with more statistical authority.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH STRATEGY

Within this chapter, I will discuss the construction of both my
research strategy and my adoption of Robert Rickards’ computer model.
To retain a high degree of intersubjective validity, I have duplicated the
basic format of Rickards’ doctoral dissertation.

Intersubjective validity

refers to the empirical and logical relationship found between two models
or comparative studies.

By duplicatinglRidkardsT’ variable list and

adopting his computer model, I have attempted to retain a strong empirical
base for future comparative analyses.

Rickards' description of Germany's

municipal budget formulation was instrumental to the development of this
analysis.
This research framework is quite simple, the advantages of construct
ing such a model are twofold.

First, the large number of prefectures

studied in this paper (forty-six) would be beyond the scope of a researcher’s
time if all possible input information were included in the development
of this model.

Second, fewer assumptions are involved and therefore the

theoretical framework is stronger.
Adopting such a simple model does have its drawbacks.

A trade-off

of explanatory capacity for this simplicity must be aknowledged.

Yet

by retaining the computer model which Rickard’s previously employed, I
can be more confident of its predictive ability and intersubjective compara
bility.

Therefore, for this study, the advantages of adopting a simple

computer model and research strategy outweigh the disadvantages of not
20
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employing a more intricate format.
The explicitness of mathematics and computer language affords the
researcher a strong, unambiguous base for his analysis.

By comparing

46 prefectures observed budgetary behavior with the computer's predicted
outputs:: the model adopted in this thesis will measure budget-share
stability.
"Process models of budget-making behavior are useful,in measuring
intercity variance in budget share stability.

They also help to

explain why, once a city has cut its fiscal pie in a particular
pattern in a given year, it continues to slice successive fiscal
pies in about the same proportions-;*"

29

The weakness of such models lies in their inability to account for
deviations from the stable-share patterns.

Yet Rickards has pointed out

that this weakness may be overcome by first defining such deviation as
demonstrated budgetary flexibility and then by subjecting this variable
to analysis in a regression model.

Demonstrated budgetary flexibility

(DBF) is measured as the absolute value of a pr.ef.e.ckujejjs deviation from
the

ideal stable-share

rule' summed across* all departments *; divided \

by two, for a specific prefecture in a specific year.

In this study I

intend to measure DBF and explain inter-prefecture differences in DBF.
By defining the explanatory variables which most affect the DBF of pre
fectures, this study can help budgetary participants understand the rela
tionship between stable-share rules and certain political and geographical
characteristics of the governments under observation.
The proposed explanatory variables tested in this paper were also
adopted, with some modifications, from Rickards' dissertation.

29

Rickards', op . cit. , p. 38.

The purpose
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of these explanatory variables is to explain the deviations from stable
budget-shares.

This is done by measuring interprefectural variation in

demonstrated flexibility.
Six prefectural expenditure categories were constructed within
my research strategy.

These categories include some which represent

a compilation of several departments.

For example, the category agricul

ture also includes the departments of forestry and fisheries, commerce and
manufacturing.

Although some departments were combined under one category

this research still contains a sizeable number of different categories
with a great deal of variation

both over prefectures and time.

Tables

II and III depict the great variations which occur in Japan's prefectural
expenditure categories.

Large differences were uncovered between one

prefecture and another in both the short (506 cases) and long (46 averaged
mean cases) runs.

These tables indicate that my data base includes a

great deal of prefectural expenditure variations and that dynamic and
pronounced differences within Japan’s forty-six prefectures are in
operation.
The choice of Japan as the geographic setting and of the decade 19671976 as the time period for this study was based both on personal interest
and data availability.

The chance to apply Rickard’s computer model to

a non-European industrialized nation was a major factor in choosing this
country for my analysis.

Another important reason for studying Japan was

its relatively small number of prefectures, yet large enough to apply largegroup statistics.

Because there are only 46 prefectures, I was able to

include the entire nation’s prefectural governments in this study.
30
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The large number of municipalities in Germany and the great variation
in their population sizes persuaded Robert Rickards to analyze the 105
cities which contained at least 50,000 citizens in the 1965 census. My
study included all Japanese prefectures except for Okinawa which had not
been re-incorporated into Japan until after my time series began.
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The time period was chosen because of the consistent statistical
information available during this ten-year time series.

All of the

raw data for this quantitative model was extracted from the Japan
31
Statistical Yearbook.

Alterations in reported data occur frequently

in the years before 1967 and after 1976.

The time series 1967-1976

was chosen because the data was consistent over these years.
Several negative consequences concerning the chosen geographic and
temporal settings for this study may exist.

The first potential weak

ness was my reliance on the accuracy of the statistical yearbooks.

Some

obvious errors were detected, but most of my statistical data were by
necessity, accepted as fact.

32

The second potential weakness was a gap in the time series.

For

whatever reasons, the Japanese government combined the 1973 and 1974 statis
tical yearbooks into one volume.

While most of this volume included

both 1973 and 1974 data, some categories —
excluded the 1973 figures.

such as net prefectural product —

To remedy this deficiency, the missing 1973

categories were estimated through linear interpolation.

The remainder

of this chapter will focus on the development of the computer model and
the relationship between DBF and prefectural budget share patterns.
John Crecine envisioned applying his intricate and sophisticated
computer model, with appropriate modifications, to the resource allocation
decision-making process in other cities and governmental units.

"The

Japan Government Press, Japan Statistical Yearbook.
32

The obvious errors were detected in such variables as party seats.
Since both the total number of seats and the various parties’ proportion
of this total were available for scrutiny: it was possible to check the
sum of the different parties’ seats against the total number of seats.
Such errors were infrequent but they do illustrate the potential for
institutionalized errors in my data set.
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Table II
Maximum-Minimum-Mean of J ap an ’s
Expenditure Categories
(Short-Run = 506 cases*)

Expenditure Category

Maximum

Minimum

Mean

Std. Dev

General Administration

128,711.00

1,540.00

10,423.80

13,881.40

Welfare

373,214.00

2,587.10

20,363.50

33,469.20

Agriculture

222,348.00

4,927.78

28,680.70

23,122.80

Public Works

387,913.00

5,753.20

38,537.20

45,277.80

Police and Fire Protection

318,246.00

1,511.77

13,261.30

27,318.30

Education

454,876.00

8,848.70

51,245.00

52,587.10

(sum of the above 1 ,691,740.00
6 categories in
each prefecture
in each year)

22,163.00

Gwappe

162,511.00 180,877.00

*includes base year data 1966.
The above stated totals are in millions of yen and represent deflated
values.
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Table III
Maximum-Minimum-Mean of Japan’s
Expenditure Categories
(Long-Run = 46 cases)

Expenditure Category

Maximum

Minimum

Mean

Std. Dev.

General Administration

121,350.00

2,340.80

10,423.80

11,950.00

Welfare

343,440.30

3,s7 80.00

20,363.50

30,200.80

Agriculture

219,476.00

5,400.00

28,680.70

17,516.80

Public Works

340,995.80

6,250.30

38,537.20

31,956.00

Police and Fire Protection

317,246.00

2,940.75

13,261.30

25,887.65

Education

402,880.30

9,950.75

51,245.00

50,951.00

1,425,865.00

29,542.00

162,511.00

162,366.00

GWAPPE (meaned
above 6
in each
in each

sum of the
categories
prefecture
year)

The above stated totals are in millions of yen and represent deflated values.
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possibilities of the general applicability of this model of internal
resource allocation to non-market organizations are highly encouraging."
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Crecine’s resource allocation procedures are quite similar to Wildavsky's
aids to calculation.

Both men applied a set of allocation rules that

may be considered incrementally organized steps.

This set of rules support

Lindbloom's hypothesis which maintained that policy problems are fragmented
and dealt with individually rather than comprehensively.
The set of allocation rules which are mentioned by these authors and
others who favor incrementalist descriptions has been adopted as the first
three steps of the budgetary model presented in Table IV.

This simple

model assumed that by retaining a proportionality among departmental
budget-shares all involved in the budgetary process are satisfied.

the

first three steps in Table IV may be summarized as follows.
In the first step the h

tTi

prefecture's chief finance officer formulates

his expenditure estimate for the i

th

administrative unit (department),

from budget resources, j, in year k, by denoting the amount authorized

A
for expenditure in the base year k-1.

That is,

^^hijk*

In the second step, the finance officer "satisfices" the prefecture's
departments spending demands by increasing each estimate on a fixed
percentage basis.

This is done by distributing to each department a "fair-

share" of the remaining revenue,

( R E V ^ ^ “ ^^hjk-L^ ’

retains each departments proportion of the budget pie.

^his adjustment
This proportion,

a^^_. , is an empirically estimated parameter which reflects the departments'
historical budget shares.
During the third step of the resource allocation process the finance

Crecine, oj3. cit. p. 231.
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officer checks the balance between the sum of revised expenditure
estimates,

tJ 4
.E_ EXP, . .. , and anticipated revenues, REV,
.
i=L
hijk
hjk

If a

deficit is calculated the finance officer will eliminate it by allocat
ing proportional budgetary cuts (fixed percentage cuts) among the
different prefectural departments.,

In the case of a surplus, proportional

spending increases are allocated to the various departments.

In this

resource allocation model, the application of "fair share" strategy
implies that anticipated revenues equal the sum of revised expenditure
estimates.

This is because the stable share proportions, a ^ ^ » summed

across all departments necessarily equal unity.
This model is extremely mechanistic due to its inability to consider
executive and legislative reactions to public or other demands for budget
share alterations.
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To remedy this deficiency and account for deviations

from the ideal and mechanistic decision-making routine of the computer
model, a measurement (demonstrated budgetary flexibility) has been adopted
from Robert Rickards' study.
To identify DBF, the computer model employs two additional steps
(Table IV).

Having produced a balanced budget for year k, the model then

calculates the i

th

department's predicted budget-share, BS.

The model

then formulates the differences between observed and predicted budget-

A

shares, BS, .
- BS, . .
hi3k
hijk

After the spending recommendations have been

allotted the model measures the prefectures' deviations from the stableshare rule by calculating the absolute values of the observed and predicted
budget shares,

Ibid., pp. 156-162.
Crecine's computer analysis revealed that
political pressures are not very effective factors in the resource
allocating process.
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Table IV
Simple, Stable-Share, Resource Allocation Model
for Measuring Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility

EXP.... _
hijk-L

Ef h i j k

3.

E

hijk

REV

*

hijk

_)
hjk-L

hjk
yes
V

*•

I

(EXP

BW

// REVh .k )

/\

5. I BS, ... - BS . ..
hijk
hijk

The source for this model was extracted from Robert Rickards' doctoral
dissertation, p. 83.
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Both short- and long-run analyses of the explanatory variables’
relationship with DBF were conducted.

The short-run was constructed

from 460 individual cases; specifically, 46 prefectures over a merged
time series of 10 annual cross-sections.

The long-run consisted of

46 cases, with each case based on the mean values for each variable,
for each prefecture, over the ten-year time series.
In Table V the descriptive statistics for long- and short-run DBF
are presented.

The mean percentage change in both analyses has been

calculated as 2.79 percent.

This slight budget share alteration is

compatible with Campbell's findings.

(Table I).

This mean percentage

change demonstrates that in the average' year, the average prefecture
reallocates less than 3 percent of its budget.
When statistical averages of Japan's 46 prefectures were calculated,
the annual demonstrated budgetary flexibility appeared extremely stable
in the long-run.

The variation from minimum to maximum change in annual

budget shares was slightly more than 2 percent.

The minimum DBF was

calculated as 1.79 percent while the maximum budget-share change, was
only 3.82 percent.

Thus, in the long-run, Japanese prefectures' budget-

shares changed less than 4 percent in every case.
In the short-run, there was much greater variation in the prefectures'
budget share stability (Table V ) .

The range of budgetary flexibility

has been measured as nearly 9 percent.

The maximum annual budget-share

change among the prefectures in the short-run is revealed in Table V as
being 9.01 percent.

This is a substantial increase and suggests that

within some prefectures dynamic budgetary processes are in operation.
should be noted that my measurement of annual budget-share change, in
both the long- and short-runs, has tended to understate DBF.

This is

It
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due to the averaging of eleven categories into six departmental categories.
By consolodating some categories that were presented in the Japan
Statistical Yearbooks I have understated DBF.

Therefore, in the short

run, there was greater instability among budget-shares than the 9.01
percent would indicate.
Table V indicates that budget-share outcomes, at the departmental
level, are largely compatible with the norm of baransu.

The 2.79 percent

mean change in prefectural budget-share patterns illustrates the pronounced
emphasis in Japan on fixed-percentage, across-the-board adjustments.
A 2.79 percent mean change is quite an incremental adjustment.

The

maximum change indicated in the short-run (9.01%) probably would not be
accepted as evidence of incrementalism by most researchers.

Therefore,

while the overall pattern suggests that incremental techniques are popular
tools in prefectural budgetary strategy there are some individual
exceptions to the rule.
The simple model employed in this paper does appear to predict
behavior in both the short- and long-runs for the average prefecture quite
well.

But baransu seems to be much more in evidence in some prefectures

and some years than in others.

The short-run analysis, which depicts

some large budget-share changes, does indicate that the norm of baransu
does not pervade every individual budgetary process equally, in every
prefecture in every year.
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Table V
Long and Short Run Statistics Describing Japan's
Prefectures Average Annual Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility

(Long-Run = 46 cases)

Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility
Minimum
DBF =

BS, .
- BS, .
hijk
hijk

.0179,(1.79%)

Maximum
.0382 (3.82%)

Mean
.0279 (2 79%)

(Short-Run = 460 cases)

Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility
Minimum
DBF = I BS, . .. -

\

hijk

bK

. ..
hijk

.0041 (141%)

Maximum
.0901 (9.01%)

Mean
.0279 (5 .79%)

CHAPTER IV
EXPLAINING INTERPREFECTURAL VARIATION IN DEMONSTRATED
BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY

In Robert Rickards’ final analysis, three explanatory variables
were revealed to be significantly related to DBF under his general fund
classification.

In my study I have also tested general fund expenditures

but have not considered, as does Rickards, total expenditures.

The

former classification represents non-capital expenditures that are
covered by general revenue, the latter includes day-to-day operating
expenses which are not covered by general revenue (capital construction
projects, internal transfer payments, etc.)

It should be noted that a

prefecture or city may allocate from its general expenditures as it sees
fit, and may more.easily alter departmental budget-shares than it can
with its total budget.
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When I repeated Rickards’ correlation and regression analyses in
the Japanese setting, all three variables retained their statistical
significance.

The variables which remained important in my research

measured local resource availability, environmental complexity, and
interparty competition.

These three explanatory variables were measured
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The three explanatory variables in Rickards’ study which proved to
be significantly related with budgetary flexibility in the general fund
are:
local resource availability, measured as the hypothetical per-capita
yield from per-capita revenue-sharing receipts and from the four major
local tax basest
environmental complexity, measured by the natural log
of population size; and interparty competition, measured by the percentage
of votes obtained by the SPD party.
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somewhat differently in my study than in Rickards' dissertation.

This

modification may slightly weaken both the significance of my findings and
their intersubjective comparability with Rickards' findings.

This slight

modification in the measured techniques of my three significant variables,
as well as other proposed explanatory variables, was a necessary adjust
ment.

It is not uncommon for a particular computer model, when subjected

to other environments, to require some measurement modifications.
In Rickards' study local resource availability was measured by
taxable capacity.

My measurement of this variable was quite similar.

Incomes from private corporations, unincorporated enterprises, and property
were measured relative to population, as was compensation of employees.
These four components were subjected to a GNP deflator index and then
added together.

The resulting measurement was then described as local

resource availability.
Environmental complexity was measured in Robert Rickards' model by
the natural log of city population size.
measured by prefectural populations size.

In my study this variable was
The reason I did not use the

natural log is because when plotted a downward sloping line was indicated
whereas Rickards' plot revealed a downward sloping curve.

The reason

for this dissimilarity is the different ranges of population found in the
two studies.

In Germany, the population range of municipalities considered

in Rickards' research was from 50,000 to 1.3 million.

In Japan the

prefectural population range was from 574,000 to 11.5 million.

The

discrepancy in the two plots may be related to a threshold effect.

Once

an environment gets over a certain size (e.g. 250,000) environemntal
complexity is no longer geometrically related to population size but rather
it is arithmetically related.

When a small governmental unit increases in
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size, a large increase in environmental complexity also occurs.

Yet

a large governmental unit is already so complex that an increase in
population does not affect its environmental complexity nearly as much.
Rickards’ measurement of interparty competition was defined as the
absolute value of 50% - %SPD votes.

This measurement of votes was

necessary in the German study since no information was available on the
number of seats the SPD had in council.

In Germany the percentage of

votes for the SPD roughly coincides with the party’s proportion of council
seats.

In Japan this estimate is not accurate.

In rural areas, indepen

dent council members tend to vote with the LDP and conservatives simply
may not run on the LDP label.

To avoid this potentially weakening formu

lation I have measured interparty competition as the absolute value of
50% - % of LDP seats.

The concept is the same but the measurement is

somewhat different and less reliable due to the fact that some "independents"
in fact are merely disguised LDP members.

We do not know if an independent

is really a non-label LDP member.
If Robert Rickards’ conclusions concerning the above mentioned variables’
relationship with DBF are correct, his findings ought to be broadly dupli
cated within this study; if his model is to become an empirically valid
cross-national budgetary indicator.

It is my expectations that Rickards’

findings will be corroborated within this paper.

His analysis revealed

that as local resource availability increased, DBF also increased.

In

municipalities where resources were totally committed, the ability to ini
tiate new programs and alter existing budget-shares was found to be minimal.
Those cities which had a relatively greater capacity to generate revenue
and realize a resource surplus over their existing commitments were found
to be more able to engage in discretionary spending and alter their
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existing budget-share patterns.
In his analysis, he found environmental complexity to be inversely
related to DBF.

Budget officials in more complex German municipalities

were revealed to be less inclined to alter existing interdepartmental
expenditure priorities.

In more populous cities there are greater

varieties of citizen demands initiated for the available goods and ser
vices.

In big cities, budget-makers are confronted with both higher

decision costs and more people who want a multitude of specific services.
Therefore, in such a complex environment, there is a heavier reliance
on stable share allocation rules than in less complex environments.
Although strong interparty competition might be considered by many
proponents of democratic ideals to be positively related to increasing
DBF, Rickards’ study found this relationship to be unfounded.

The fact

that West German political parties do not enter into formal coalitions
in municipal governments was a decisive factor for the results which
followed.

In more competitive situations no West German municipal party

was capable of securing a majority of council seats and therefore'a
political majority to alter established budget-share patterns was lacking.
Cities which were dominated by a single party in Germany tended to
demonstrate greater budgetary flexibility.

In Japan's prefectures, poli

tical parties also do not enter into formal coalitions.

My findings

ought to suggest the same relationship between interparty competition and
DBF as did Rickards’ dissertation.
In order to substantiate the assumed relationship between environ
mental complexity and budgetary flexibility I have included Table VI
in this analysis.

If population size is indeed a good indicator of environ

mental complexity, the following correlation table should demonstrate that
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Table VI
Testing the Relationship Between Prefectural Population Size
and Environmental Complexity
Short-Run Analysis

Correlation Coefficients/Prob

R

under H0:RH0=0/# of observations

Prefectural
Employees
Prefectural
Employees

General
Employees

GWAPPE

Population
Size

GWAPPE

1.00000
0.0000
460

0.95884

0.93444

0.85210

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.95884

1.00000
0.0000
460

0.80767

0.77317

0.0001

0.0001

460

460

0.93444
0.0001
460

0.80767
0.0000
460

1.00000
0.0000
460

0.0001
460

Population
Size

General
Employees

460

460

460

0.81282

0.0001
460

0.85210

0.77317

0.81282

1.00000

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

460

460

460

0.0000
460

as population increases the complexity of the decision-making environ
ment also increases.

Increasing environmental complexity involves the

need to allocate more resources among more competing goals.

The variables

included in this table are all civil servants (prefectural and general
employees, population size, and the total amount of money spent by the
prefectures on the six major expenditure categories (GWAPPE).

Budget

size and the number of civil servants are indicators of resources and
competing budget goals.

Civil servants indicate the latter because almost

all programs require administrative staffs.

If the relationships uncovered

among these variables are highly intercorrelated, the variable population
size can be accepted as a valid indicator of environmental complexity.
Table VI demonstrates that a high level of intercorrelation does
exist among the variables included in the correlation matrix.

These

findings seem to substantiate the argument that as population increases
the complexity of the decision-making environment increases.

Prefectures

with larger population sizes tended to employ more civil servants and to
spend more money.

Thus there was a concurrent increase in the complexity

of the administrative decision-making process with increased population
size.
Tables VII and VIII describe the variation in the significant
explanatory variable and the dependent variable (DBF) in both the shortand long-run.

The variation in budgetary flexibility has been previously

discussed in Chapter III.

In the following analysis I will concentrate

on the variation uncovered concerning the three significant explanatory
variables.
In the short-run (Table VII), a large disparity was found to exist
between different prefectures,1local resource availability.

It should be
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Table VII
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables
(Short-Run = 460 cases)

Variables

Maximum

Demonstrated
Budgetary Flexibility

09.01

Local Resource Availability*
(real yen/capita)

51.924

Environmental Complexity
(population size)
Interparty Competition
(50%-% LDP seats)

*in millions of yen

11,669,162

17.725

Minimum

Mean

00.41

02.79

1.363

24.367

6.525

9.729

568,776

2,296,783

0.000

8.525

Std. Dev.

1,039. 848

4.085
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Table VIII
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables
(Long-Run = 46 cases)

Variables
Demons trated
Budgetary Flexibility
Local Resource Availability*
(real^yen/capita)
Environmental Complexity
(population size)
Interparty Competition
(50%-% LDP seats)

*in millions of yen

Maximum

Minimum

Mean

03.82

01.79

02.79

0.422

24.367

4.638

42.245

11,448,434

16.320

16.975

574,583

2,296,783

2.862

Std. Dev.

1,046, 413

8.525

3.300

noted that all income related variables were subjected to a GNP price
deflator and thus represent real per capita figures.

While the poorest

prefecture had slightly less than 10 million yen of income to allocate
among its various departments and expenditure categories, the richest
prefecture had more than five times the available local resources to
draw upon.

If Rickards’ assertions are correct those cities with greater

fiscal autonomy (greater local resource availability) ought to demonstrate
greater budgetary flexibility.
As Table VII indicates, there is a great variation in Japan's
prefectures’ populations.

The maximum population size (Tokyo) was nearly

12 million while the smallest prefecture (Tottiro) had a population twenty
times smaller than Tokyo’s (568,776).

In order for my finding to substan

tiate Rickards', larger prefectures should tend to demonstrate a greater
reluctance to alter existing interdepartmental expenditure priorities
than smaller prefectures.
In the short-run analysis (Table VII), interparty competition varied
from a prefecture where the LDP held exactly 50 percent of the council
seats (0.000) to a prefecture where the LDP was in strong control, holding
nearly 68 percent of the council seats (17.725).

The mean score (8.5),

or roughly 58.5 percent of the seats, indicates that, on average, the
LDP can feel quite secure about its dominant position.

If Rickards'

reasoning is correct my findings should show that in prefectures where
the LDP has a strong control of council seats (less interparty competition
and thus a higher score on this measure) budget-share patterns are more
easily altered than in a more competitive situation.
The long-run analysis of these three significant explanatory variables
(Table VIII) also depicts a great degree of variation among Japanese
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prefectures.

The reason why maximum scores dropped and minimum scores

increased, relative to the short-run, is because of the averaging
effect adopted for calculating the means of the 46 prefectures, in
the various variables tested, over the ten-year time-series.

To answer

the questions concerning the conditions under which prefectures ought
to demonstrate greater budgetary flexibility, the following summary is
presented.

Increasing DBF is associated with higher levels of local

resource availability, or lower levels of environmental complexity or
interparty competition.

A low interparty competition level is indicated

by a high score on my measure.
The long-run analysis is statistically more interesting than is the
short-run.

Statistical tables reveal that my long-run analysis is

capable of explaining 36 percent of the variance while the short-run
can only explain 12 percent of the variance.

This point should be con

sidered when reading my results.
Table IX and X describe the zero order correlations for the signifi
cant variables in both the short- and long-run.

In Table IX the short-

run correlation matrix reveals that there is a moderately high level of
intercorrelation exhibited between local resource availability and environ
mental complexity.

The resulting R (.61140) also indicates that as popu

lation increases, local resource availability per-capita increases.

The

significance level of this relationship (.0001) is well within the .05
significance level range.
The variable environmental complexity is not statistically significant
with DBF (.3227) in the short-run (Table IX).
relationship is opposite to my expectations.

The direction of this
If the theoretical relationship

between DBF and environmental complexity is correct there should be a
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Table IX
Zero-Order Correlations
Correlations of the Significant Variables Without Controls
(Short-Run = 460 cases)

Variables
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility

Local Resource
Availability

Environmental
Complexity

Interparty
Competition

Demonstrated
Budgetary Flexibility

1.00000
0.00000

0.0001

0.04621
0.3227

0.09739
0.0368

Local Resource
Availability

0.29312

1.00000

0.61140

0.0001

0.0000

0.0001

-0.16600
0.0003

0.04621
0.3227

0.61140

1.00000

-0.28901

0.0001

0.0000

0.0001

0.09739
0.0368

-0.16600
0.0003

-0.28901

1.00000
0.0000

Environmental Complexity

Interparty Competition

0.29312

0.0001
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Table X
Zero-Order Correlations
Correlations of the Significant Variables Without Controls
(Long-Run = 46 cases)

Variables
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility

Local Resource
Availability

Environmental
Complexity

Interparty
Competition

Demonstrated
Budgetary Flexibility

1.00000
0.0000

0.36793
0.0119.

0.08362
0.5806

0.23016
0.1239

Local Resource
Availability -

0.36793
0.0119

1.00000
0.0000

0.83910

0.0001

-0.24622
0.0990

Environmental Complexity

0.08362
0.5806

0.83910

1.00000
0.0000

-0.34018
0.0207

0.23016
0.1239

-0.24622
0.0990

-0.34018
0.0207

1.00000
0.0000

Interparty Competition

^Significance level at .05

0.0001
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negative sign in front of 0.04621 because Rickards' findings indicate
that there is an inverse relationship between the two variables.

As

environmental complexity increases budgetary flexibility should decrease.
The reason for environmental complexity's described relationship with
DBF in Table IX may be due to the failure to control for the effects of
the other explanatory variables.
In Table IX, the significance level (0.0368) and the correlation
coefficient (R) for interparty competition (0.09739) do give credance
to the theory which I have previously expounded.

Although there is a

negative relationship between this variable and DBF the resulting R is
positive because of my measurement technique.

A positive association

reveals that as interparty competition decreases demonstrated budgetary
flexibility increases.
Table X includes the long-run analysis of the significant variables.
As in the short-run table, a high level of intercorrelation between
local resource availability and environmental complexity (.83910) is
revealed.

The significance level (.0001) of this relationship remained

strong in the long-run.

Local resource availability's relationship with

DBF remained quite similar to the short-run analysis.
The relationship between environmental complexity and DBF was again
found not to be statistically significant (.5806), and the direction of
this relationship was still opposite to that suggested by theory.

However,

before concluding that this assertion of Robert Rickards is invalid in
the Japanese context, I will control for the other explanatory variables.
In Table X rising interparty competition remained negatively related
to DBF (as interparty competition rises budgetary flexibility decreases),
but the significance level (0.1239) deteriorated.

The validity of the
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findings suggested in Tables IX and X will be tested by controlling
for potential contaminating elements (second-order correlations).
In Tables XI and XII the correlation between the dependent variable
(DBF) and each significant explanatory variable, controlling for the
other two explanatory variables, is examined.

These second-order

correlations are both more significant and informative than the previous
correlation tables because the effects of the other explanatory variables
are not allowed to contaminate the true relationship between DBF and each
individual explanatory variable.
The results depicted in Table XI indicate that the other explanatory
variables were indeed contaminating the results in the short-run analysis.
Local resource availability remained significant (0.000) and its R (0.3357)
suggest that it is the strongest candidate predictor of DBF.
When both local resource availability and interparty competition were
controlled, environmental complexity became both statistically significant
(0.001) and its correlation coefficient became negative (-0.1445).

The

data supports the theoretical proposition which Rickards' had drawn from
his study of West German municipalities.

As environmental complexity

decreases DBF increases.
Table XI also reveals that interparty competitions R is much stronger
than short-run zero-order correlation revealed (0.1179).

The statistical

significance of this variable also increased dramatically to .006 from a
previous zero-order significance of .0368.

The contaminating influence

in this case was mostly from environmental complexity’s negative association
with interparty competition.

When this negative association was controlled

for interparty competition was revealed as a much better predictor of DBF
than it was previously portrayed to be in the zero-order short-run analysis
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Table XI
Second-Order Correlations
Correlations Between Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility and
Each Explanatory Variable, Controlling for the
Other Two Explanatory Variables
(Short-Run - 460 cases)

Variables
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility

1.00000

Demonstrated
Budgetary Flexibility

0.0000

Local Resource
Availability

0.3357
0.0000

Environmental Complexity

■0.1445

0.001
Interparty Competition

*Significance level at .05

0.1179
0.006
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Table XII
Second-Order Correlations
Correlations Between Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility and
Each Explanatory Variable, Controlling for the Other Two
Explanatory Variables
(Long-Run = 46 cases)

Variables
Demonstrated
Budgetary
Flexibility
Demonstrated
Budgetary Flexibility

1.0000
0.000

Local Resource
Availability

0.5511
0.000

Environmental Complexity

Interparty Competition

*Significance level at .05

-0.3925
0.004
0.2807
0.032
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(Table IX).
The long-run second-order correlation (Table XII) also indicates
that my zero-order results were weakened by contamination from the
uncontrolled explanatory variables.

In the long-run, the strength of

local resource availability’s correlation increased from a zero-order R
of .36793 to a second-order R of .5511.

Its statistical significance also

increased markedly from .0119 to .000.
As in the short-run, the second-order correlation of environmental
complexity with DBF became negative (-0.3925) and thus theoretically
justifiable.

Its statistical significance level also increased dramatically

from a zero-order level of .5806 to a second-order level of .004.
Table XII shows that interparty competition’s R value remained almost
identical to its zero-order correlation coefficient (.2807).

Yet its

statistical significance rose from .1239 to .032.
In both the short- and long-run second-order correlations, all three
explanatory variables were revealed as being both statistically more
significant and having higher correlation coefficients than they did in
the uncontrolled zero-order tables.

These findings support Robert Rickards’

theories concerning budgetary flexibility and its relationship to the
three significant explanatory variables considered in both of our studies.
The preceding analysis has further confirmed the theoretical relationship
between DBF and local resource availability, environmental complexity,
and interparty competition.
as follows.

The results of this analysis may be summarized

As local resource availability increases, prefectures are

better able to redistribute budget resources and change budget-share
patterns.
lity.

DBF is positively associated with rising local resource availabi

As environmental complexity increases the prefectures’ budgetary
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finance officers’ decision-making environment becomes more complex due
to the increasing number of citizen demands, governmental employees,
and the amount of money to be spent on various expenditure categories.
In such a complex environment, budget-share patterns are less easily
altered.

The results in this chapter have also shown that in a more

competitive political situation, where no single party can muster a
majority,, budget-shares are less flexible

than in a less competitive

situation.
Regression analyses of these significant variables are presented
in Tables XIII and XIV.

Table XIII reveals that the short-run model

is capable of accounting for 12.65 percent of the interprefectural
differences in DBF (RSQR = .1265).

In Table XIV the long-run is shown

as being able to account for 36.12 percent of the interprefectural
differences in DBF (RSQR = .3612).

While the short-run can only explain

a little of the variance the long-run is capable of explaining a good
amount of the variance.

The reasons why I am able to account for such

a small amount of variance in the short-run is because of the greater
influence on this model of many undefined variables.

To the extent that

these undefined variables' effects are random, they should offset one
another in the long-run, enhancing the values of my three explanatory
variables.

The evidence indicates that this capability of the long-run

to explain more of the variance is the case in my analysis.
The beta weights of the explanatory variables measures each one’s
contribution to the variance explained in the short- and long-run.

In

Table XIII the beta weight of local resource availability indicates that
it is the most useful of the three explanatory variables, accounting for
58 percent of the explained variance.

36
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Table XIII
Short-Run Regression of Demonstrated Budgetary
Flexibility on Local Resource Availability, Environmental
Complexity, and Interparty Competition

n=460

mult-, r = .35565
RSQR = .1265
Dep. Mean = .005845
F = 22.010

Variable
Local Resource
Availability
Environmental
Complexity
Interp^arty
Competition

B

.8793771D-01

Beta

.42100“

-.2328930D-06

-.17769

738655320D-01

.11592

Root MSE = .025560

Standard
Error B

.01155

.00000

.01525

Prob

57.928

.0001

9.725

70019

6.428

.0116

T
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Table XIV
Long-Run Regression of Mean Demonstrated
Budgetary Flexibility on Mean Values of Local
Resource Availability, Environmental Complexity, and
Interparty Competition

n=46

mult, r = .60130
Dep. Mean = .055845

Variable
Local Resource
Availability

Envi ronmen ta1
Complexity

Interparty
Competition

RSQR = .3612
F = 7.917

B

Beta

Root MSE = .006981

Standard
Error B

F

Prob.

.8852304D-01

.97319

.02068

18.319

.0001

-.2613509D-06

-.64818

.00000

7.650

.0084

.2961381D-01

.24928

.01563

3.592

.0650

T
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Environmental complexity was consistently the second strongest
predictor in the short-run regression, as it had been in the previous
tables.

Both its beta weight and significance level (.0019) reconfirmed

its theoretical relationship with DBF.

Interparty competition also

remained significant in Table XIII.
In Table XIV the three explanatory variables retained their propor
tional predictive capabilities with local resource availability again
having the highest beta weight (52 percent) and strongest statistical
significance (.0001).

The fact that interparty competition has a

significance score of .065 should not be taken as depicting its statistical
invalidity . This decline in significance is due in part to the increased
explanatory power of the other two explanatory variables in the long-run.
Another reason for this decline is the imprecise measurement :
technique employed for this variable.

It is not known how many indepen

dent seat holders really are disguised LDP numbers.
This chapter has helped define the relationship between DBF and the
explanatory variables.

An increase in DBF results from either an increase

in local resource availability or a decrease in environmental complexity
or interparty competition.

In the short run, the beta weights indicate

During the development of this thesis a number of proposed
explanatory variables were tested for their relationship with budgetary
flexibility.
Of these variables only three were found to be statistically
significant (the same variables which Rickards found to be significant in
his general fund analysis). A number of other explanatory variables were
discarded from my study because of their high intercorrelation with my
measurement of local resource availability.
These discarded variables
measured local taxes, shared taxes, and treasury disbursements.
These
variables may serve as potential indicators of further significant
relationships with demonstrated budgetary flexibility.
A computer model
where local resource availability is controlled for, in relation to these
discarded variables, might uncover some important relationships between
these three variables and budget-share flexibility.
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that local resource availability is nearly 2.5 times stronger a predictor
of DBF than is environmental complexity, and nearly 4 times better at
predicting DBF than is interparty competition.

Clearly the policy

variable for national-level officials to manipulate in order to increase
prefectural demonstrated budgetary flexibility is local resource availabi
lity.

One way this might be done is by the national government supplying

lower interest loans for private corporation construction projects in
low DBF prefectural areas.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

Local resource availability remained the strongest predictor of
demonstrated budgetary flexibility in both the short- and long-run
analysis.

The evidence presented in the statistical tables supports

the argument that prefectures with higher levels of local resource
availability tend to demonstrate higher levels of budget-share flexibi
lity.
Aaron Wildavsky’s research corroborates the importance of economic
wealth to budgetary strategy.

He has indicated that economic wealth

(local resource availability) is one of the most significant influences
on American cities’ budgeting behavior.
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The relative level of economic

resources is indeed the decisive factor underlying Japanese prefectures’
propensity to deviate from established budget-share patterns.
My findings support the view that wealthy prefectures are more apt
to shift departmental budget-shares than are poorer prefectures.

A

possible explanation for this conclusion is the perceived cost of changing
the budget-share strategy to accomodate a disproportional increase in
a particular department.

In wealthy prefectures the high level of local

resource availability minimizes the absolute losses which advocates of
alternative budget-share patterns must accept.

37

This minimization of losses

Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
Processes, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), pp. 114-135.
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tends to decrease political opposition to beginning these altered
budget strategies.

This information implies that the norm of baransu

is more readily identifiable with some prefectures, in some years,
than it is in others.

The more wealthy a prefecture is the less its

budget strategy will conform to baransu.
Environmental complexity also proved to be statistically significant
to DBF in both the short- and long-run analyses.

The data introduced

in Chapter IV indicate that officials in more complex environments are
less inclined to alter existing budget-share patterns across departments.
Environmental complexity seems to cause decision-makers to depend more
heavily on calculation aids and historical precedents.
This finding has been implied within John Campbell’s research
concerning Japan’s national budgetary behavior.

Campbell states that

government finance officers rely on stable-share rules for allocating
resources among administrative units because of the complexity of the
decision-making process.

This reasoning supports my finding that large

prefectures are more dependent on stable-share rules because of their
intricate and cumbersome environments.
John Crecine has stated that population is unrelated to a city’s
reliance on incremental strategies.
"A smaller city is faced with somewhat less complex problems
involving fewer variables and interrelationships.

This simpli

fication is more than offset by the fact that the small cities
also have fewer sources of information and computational abilities.
My research findings do not substantiate Crecine’s reasoning that budget-
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share patterns are independent of population size.
concentrated on only a few large American cities.

Crecine’s study
Because of this

reliance on large cities, his analysis did not include a large variation
in population sizes.

Crecine should have checked his model on some

smaller cities before pronouncing his conclusion concerning the relation
ship between environmental complexity and population size.
In Japan’s prefectures, as in Germany's municipalities, the more
competitive a party system i s , the greater is its reluctance to depart
from established budget-share patterns.

This finding - - that a positive

relationship exists among decreasing interparty competition and increas
ing flexibility - - runs counter to the" conclusions of some preceding
studies.
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It should be noted that, due to the measurement technique

employed, when the measure increases in value, competition is decreasing.
Gerald Wright suggests that municipal governments with greater inter
party competition are more sensitive to public opinion demands calling for
alterations in the budget-share patterns.

Basic democratic theory implies

that competition in the political spectrum ought to increase the representa
tiveness, and consequently flexibility, of governmental resource allocation
procedures.

My findings have demonstrated that competition actually reduces

budgetary-flexibility in Japan’s prefectures.
In Japan, as in Germany, political parties at the prefectural or
municipal level do not enter into formal coalitions.
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Therefore in a

strongly competitive political race where the LDP does not have an effective

39

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "Interparty Competition and State Social
Welfare Policy: When A Difference makes a Difference," Journal of
Politics, (August, 1975), pp. 796-803.
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majority, no political party is able to control a majority of the council
seats.

In such a situation the consensus necessary for altering established

budget-share patterns is not likely to develop.

In both Japan and

Germany, prefectures or municipalities with less interparty competition
tend to demonstrate greater budgetary flexibility.
Although this study does not purport to be an in-depth comparative
analysis, Table XV offers a summary investigation of both mine and Robert
Rickards’ statistical findings.

When the beta weights were calculated

for the three explanatory variables both studies indicated that local
resource availability was the strongest predictor of DBF.

In my study

this variable was capable of explaining 52 percent of the models explainable
variance while in Rickards' study.this variable was capable of explaining
43 percent of his model’s explainable variance.

A model’s explainable

variance is only a proportion (36.12 percent in my long-run analysis) of
the actual variance.

The beta weights also illustrate that environmental

complexity was the second best indicator of DBF in both studies.
Table XV also demonstrates that local resource availability retained
its predominant statistical correlation significance in both studies.
While my R measurement is somewhat stronger (.5511) than Rickards'
both are extremely significant.

(.4477)

Both my correlation coefficient for

environmental complexity (-.3925) and Rickards'
relationship of this variable to DBF.

(-.3206) depict the negative

My interparty competition score

(.2807) is nearly identical to Rickards correlation statistic (.2668).
both of our findings support the relationship between increasing DBF and
decreasing interparty competition.

The extent of interparty competition

is defined in both studies by the same equational formulation.

Perfect

interparty competition is denoted by a score of 0 percent and a one-party
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Table XV
Comparative Summary of the Relationship Uncovered
Between Demonstrated Budgetary Flexibility and the
Three Explanatory Variables in both Japan's Prefectural
Governments and West German Municipalities:
Long-Run -Analysis of the General Fund
_____ Prefectural Data___________
N = 46

Variables
Local
Resource
Availability
Environmental
Complexity
Interparty
Competition

Beta

F

Correlation
Coefficient

.97319

18.319

0.5511

-.64818

7.650

-0.3925

.24928

3.592

0.2807

______ German Municipalities Data_____
N = 105

Variables
Local
Resource
Availability
Environmental
Complexity
Interparty
Competition

Beta

F

Correlation
Coefficient

.51236

55.173

0.4477

-.46943

44.879

-0.3206

.19466

7.742

0.2668

The data for my German municipalities table was extracted from Robert
Rickards1 diesertation entitled: Non-Routine Decision Making, pp. 186,
219, 237.
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monopoly by a score of 50 percent.

The findings in Table XV are

encouraging indications of Robert Rickards’ model’s cross-national
validity.
While, for the most part, my conclusions have substantiated
Campbell’s findings that Japan follows an incremental budget strategy
(Table I), there is one point which is not entirely compatible with his.
Campbell has stated that the LD P ’s effect on Japan’s national budget
tends to increase the stability among ministries' budget-shares.

"The

net effect of LDP participation has actually been to increase inertia
by inhibiting attacks on backward-looking expenditures."
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My research indicates that Japanese prefectural governments like
their national counterpart, rely on aids-to-calculation when formulating
their budget strategy.

Yet the effects of the LDP on the prefectural

budget strategy does appear to be more complex than Campbell contends.
Those prefectures which exhibited less interparty competition demonstrated
greater budgetary flexibility.

Therefore, while the overall effect of

the LDP may tend to be to inhibit conflict and maintain a consensus among
budgetary participants, it also seems to play a dynamic non-incremental
role in those prefectures which exhibit weak interparty competition.
Within this thesis I have tested the theoretical assumptions proposed
by Robert Rickards.,

By applying his model to another culture and nation,

and to a different level of government, my findings help to substantiate
the empirical validity of his assumptions.

The intersubjective comparability

of these two national studies should increase the significance of any
future cross-national comparisons.

It is my recommendation that Robert

^Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics, p. 275.
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Rickards’ budgetary model be applied to a variety of other national
contexts.

Only through a number of case studies can these budgetary

assumptions be more accurately tested and documented.
One idea for future research which has been generated by this analysis
concerns the relationship between DBF and interparty competition.

Do

one-party states demonstrate more budgetary flexibility than do two-party
or multiparty democracies?

Are coalitions imperative to democratic

party systems if they are to be more respondent to citizens’ demands for
alterations in the budget-share patterns?

I believe that these questions

could lead to some useful theoretical analyses and may prove to be quite
interesting to future researchers.
In conclusion; the budget-share patterns at the Japanese prefectural
level are largely compatible with the norm of baransu over the long-run
analysis.

The short-run analysis has indicated that there are frequent

exceptions to the norm of baransu.

Nevertheless, in both the short-run

and long-run, the conditions which are most predictive of a prefecture’s
reliance and existing budget-share patterns, incremental aids to
calculation, and baransu techniques, have been demonstrated as being:
1) a relatively low level of local resource availability, 2) a high level
of environmental complexity, 3) a high level of interparty competition.
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